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When is a Spy not a Spy?

Sir Vince Cable
November 18, 2026

John Le Carré would have discarded as too implausible the Jensen Huang-Chinese ‘spy’ story. One of the world’s most influential businessmen caught in a ‘honey trap’ inadvertently handing over to the Chinese the most potent weapon in the new ‘Cold War’. Really?

I happened to be in China when the story broke. I was giving a talk at a provincial university. One the students asked me what I thought about the Jensen Huang ‘affair’ and Chinese ‘spies’. The professor hastily shut him up supposedly to save me from embarrassment, but more likely his own since university authorities would ask why such ‘sensitive’ subjects were being aired in public. I was rather reassured that the news had got past the censors.

It is very unlikely that Alice Huang, the girlfriend, is a Chinese spy. President Trump, admittedly not a totally reliable source, has dismissed initial allegations linking Ms Huang to the Chinese Ministry of State Security. Ms Huang’s company, Megaspeed, had been a customer of Mr Huang’s Nvidia and at worst there may have been some technical infringements of US export licensing rules. US intelligence sources now talk of Alice Huang’s ‘links to China’: a rather inclusive definition of a ‘spy’.

The truth appears to be much more interesting than a spy thriller and not only because Jensen Huang’s sex life has led to his removal, for now, from the leadership of the world’s most valuable company. The story has brought into the open an important debate within the Washington establishment on how to deal with China’s rise.

One faction in the administration and Congress argues that the best way to maintain the US lead in frontier Ai is to keep all advanced ‘chips’, mostly produced by Nvidia, out of the hands of Chinese companies by imposing strict export controls. Act tough and demonstrate that the Chinese cannot function without US technology. Geopolitical sensitivity is heightened by the fact that the ‘chips’ are made in the world’s most advanced foundry in Taiwan, TSMC, and form the GPU’s (General Processing Units) by Mr Huang’s Nvidia, which dominates the global supply of memory chips. These are in turn used for training the AI large language models.

Critics argue that this policy is failing and not only because of loopholes like the Chinese use of data centres in Southeast Asia. The Chinese have been incentivised to bolster their own domestic manufacture through companies like Huawei and to develop clever ‘workarounds’ with inferior ‘chips’ which can do almost as good a job. Chinese companies are thought to be close behind in frontier AI. They also use ‘open weight’ business models which are proving more effective at disseminating AI, and at much lower cost, than their American counterparts. And the Chinese have the capacity to destabilise the ‘chip’ market by flooding the world with cheaper, less sophisticated, ‘chips.’

Some critics, including Jensen Huang argue, counterintuitively, that the best way to beat the Chinese is to ease export restrictions and get them hooked on American technology. (and ‘US open weight’ language models). This argument persuaded President Trump to allow sales of the second best Nvidia product – the H200 – to China. President Xi spurned the offer suggesting that he doesn’t want China to be deflected from its goal of self-reliance and to be seduced into dependence on US technology. If so, excessively rigid embargos are counter-productive, as Jensen Haung argues (while defending the need to protect the newest and best).

Ms Huang’s company, Megaspeed, had been a customer of Mr Huang’s Nvidia and at worst there may have been some technical infringements of US export licensing rules. Quote

Huang’s preference for engaging with China is shared by other influential voices: Elon Musk and Tim Cook. Musk, with Tesla, and Cook, with Apple, have both demonstrated that it is possible to operate successfully in China, boosting both American and their own corporate interests. None of the three could remotely be characterised as naïve ‘Panda huggers’; they are tough, ruthless men, patriotic Americans (Jensen Huang is also Taiwanese) and brilliant at business. Indeed, the usual ‘hawk’ v ‘dove’ distinction hardly applies in this debate. Perhaps we should distinguish between a noisy, angry parliament of crows and the wiser, more patient, owls. The crows think that their flapping and squawking will intimidate the Chinese; the owls think that they know better.

What the owls will point out is that unduly strict embargoes are not just ineffective but trigger damaging retaliation. Trump has already suffered one bruising encounter with Xi when he waded in with punitive tariffs in April. 2025. The Chinese retaliated by restricting supplies of some of the specialised metals, notably the so-called rare earths, on which some advanced manufacturing processes depend and of which China has quietly established a near-monopoly which will take years, if not decades, to break. Faced with the prospect of American industry grinding to a halt, Trump backed off (which is why we have Chinese exports facing lower tariffs in the USA than those from India, Brazil, Canada and, even, Switzerland).

The debate on how to deal with China has come to a head at the APEC summit in Shenzhen this week. And that raises the question of why the Jensen Huang story has broken a week beforehand when the facts were almost certainly known some time ago. It seems highly likely that someone – probably a US competitor - moved now to weaken Mr. Huang at a crucial time. In the short run, the ploy seems to have succeeded. Pliant Congressmen, of different political affiliations, have moved to show that they are ‘tough on China’ by promising prompt action on export controls.

Trump has himself warned that excessive zeal in enforcement risks a ‘blow up’ with China. The Chinese will conclude that they must double down on ‘self-reliance’, eschew AI cooperation and perhaps fire a salvo of their ‘big bazooka’: the rare earths. Other difficult issues—Ukraine, nuclear proliferation—are potentially affected.

And where is Britain in all of this? Frankly, peripheral. We have key bits of frontier AI, notably the Cambridge based (but Japanese owned) chip designer, ARM but we, and the EU, are not major AI players or even—like Korea, Southeast Asia, and Taiwan—an integral part of the supply chains.

Our spies are small fry, too. We are the land of Philby, Blunt and the other ‘Cambridge’ spies. Our authors produced David Hannay, Smiley and James Bond. Today’s mole hunters are reduced to tracking down juvenile parliamentary researchers who have been caught gossiping to the Chinese about minor British politicians. Le Carré would have wept.

Sir Vince Cable, Comment Central contributor

Sir John Vincent Cable is a British politician who led the Liberal Democrats from 2017 to 2019 and represented Twickenham in Parliament from 1997 to 2015 and again from 2017 to 2019. He served as Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and President of the Board of Trade in the coalition government between 2010 and 2015. Cable studied natural science and economics at Cambridge before working as a finance officer in the Kenya Treasury and lecturing in economics at Glasgow University, where he also earned his PhD. His distinguished career included roles in the Diplomatic Service, directing research at the ODI, advising the Commonwealth Secretary-General, heading the international economics programme at Chatham House, and serving as Chief Economist for Shell Group Planning.

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