Towards a sovereign British space strategy: safeguarding national security in orbit
The United Kingdom stands at a pivotal juncture in space policy. As global powers compete for orbital dominance, Britain’s defence and security require a robust, sovereign space strategy. This must prioritise independent action, a strong domestic military-industrial base, and resilience against threats. UK Defence First views defence as the government’s top priority, spanning sea, air, land, space, and cyber domains. A sovereign approach supports unilateral capability, industrial growth, alliances with AUKUS, Five Eyes, and NATO, an independent nuclear deterrent, cyber protection, and flexible procurement.
Recent proposals to weaken international satellite interference protections highlight the urgency. These changes risk eroding strategic autonomy and exposing vital assets to foreign control.
Britain’s space heritage provides lessons. Post-war programmes showed technical leadership. The Black Knight rocket tested re-entry for missiles in the 1950s. Blue Streak became a ballistic missile, later adapted for the Europa launcher. Black Arrow launched Prospero in 1971, making the UK the sixth nation to orbit a satellite independently. The Ariel series, from 1962 to 1979, advanced scientific research with NASA. Skynet satellites, starting in 1969, delivered secure military communications, evolving into Skynet 6 today. The cancelled Zircon project in the 1980s reflected ambitions for independent intelligence. Uniquely, Britain developed and then abandoned sovereign launch capability, turning to US and European providers. This reliance now heightens vulnerabilities in a contested domain.
Space underpins modern defence. Satellites enable command and control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, and communications. The Ministry of Defence uses geostationary orbit (GSO) for persistent coverage and non-geostationary orbit (NGSO) for low-latency links.
Proposed changes to Equivalent Power Flux Density (EPFD) limits at the International Telecommunication Union threaten this balance. These longstanding rules limit interference from NGSO systems, like SpaceX’s Starlink or Amazon’s Kuiper, into other networks, enabling safe spectrum sharing.
US firms push to relax these protections for greater NGSO capacity. Yet the military consequences for the UK are severe. Weakened rules would prevent small user terminals on GSO networks and impair GSO coverage by up to 50% in key regions, such as the Middle East and South America, by removing protections below 25-degree elevation angles. This disrupts drone operations, manpack communications, and surveillance, causing outages that reduce situational awareness and risk lives.
GSO systems offer near-99.99% availability for tactical missions. Increased interference could drop this below 90%, triggering failures in command, control, or nuclear networks essential to Britain’s deterrent. NGSO systems face jamming and kinetic threats, worsening risks from over-dependence on foreign providers.
Accepting these changes would hand space control to a few non-UK entities. Putting aside the aspirations for 1 million space data centres, Starlink, with nearly 50,000 communications satellites, and Amazon’s planned 13,000, alone would dominate use of space, backed by immense capital inaccessible to smaller players like Eutelsat’s OneWeb. Without EPFD limits, UK forces could rely on these firms for connectivity, restricting small-antenna options vital to warfare and eroding autonomy - especially amid transatlantic strains.
Cyber security also suffers: Unstable links enable exploitation, obscure malicious attacks as interference, and force switches to vulnerable backups.
China’s rapid NGSO growth: Beijing mirrors US moves, blending military and commercial assets for influence. Degraded limits could aid adversaries in denying UK access.
Threats span domains: electronic jamming, cyber spoofing, and kinetic anti-satellite weapons. GSO’s fixed positions provide reliability against distributed attacks on NGSO.
As the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill advances and a Defence Readiness Bill approaches, policymakers must resolve this mismatch between domestic resilience aims and efforts to alter interference rules.
Lacking sovereign launch, Britain risks marginalisation in multi-orbit competition. A sovereign strategy, using an ends-ways-means framework, must build capabilities. Invest in domestic launch at SaxaVord or Sutherland, revive manufacturing via firms like Surrey Satellite Technology, and create a UK industrial base for military needs. This delivers value, flexibility, and reduced vendor lock-in.
Alliances matter. Share technology through AUKUS, intelligence via Five Eyes, and defence via NATO. Sovereignty requires independent action, including Skynet for communications and nuclear deterrent protection. Integrate space as critical infrastructure with interference-resilient designs.
Britain must oppose weakening interference limits at the November 2026 ITU Plenipotentiary and the October-November 2027 World Radiocommunication Conference in Shanghai. Ofcom should champion existing protections to preserve multi-orbit diversity.
Investing in sovereign assets deters threats and secures orbital independence. Britain’s space legacy demands revival through a defence-first strategy. Weakened protections risk foreign dominance, but decisive action can restore autonomy. The government must act now to protect space as a British national interest.
Mark Allatt is chairman of UK Defence First, a former parliamentary candidate, and a commentator on defence, security, and foreign policy matters.
