The Case for Independence of the Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm
The Fleet Air Arm (FAA) has been integral to British maritime power since its origins as the Royal Naval Air Service in 1914. Yet its independence has repeatedly been contested, often to the detriment of naval effectiveness.
Historical lessons, from the inter-war years to recent F-35 procurement decisions, demonstrate why the FAA must regain full autonomy to meet the bespoke demands of modern maritime warfare.
In 1918 the RNAS was merged into the newly formed Royal Air Force, subordinating naval aviation to RAF priorities. By the 1930s this arrangement had starved the Fleet Air Arm of modern aircraft. The RAF focused on heavy bombers and land-based fighters, leaving the FAA with obsolete biplanes such as the Gloster Sea Gladiator.
When war came, the Royal Navy had to armour its carriers far more heavily than peers, compensating for an air group it could not trust to protect the ship. The FAA’s return to Admiralty control in May 1939 came too late to correct these deficiencies.
Early wartime operations exposed the consequences: carriers often served as little more than transports for RAF Spitfires and Hurricanes reinforcing Malta, while the venerable Swordfish achieved notable successes against the Bismarck and at Taranto largely through courage and ingenuity rather than superior equipment.
Post-war, the FAA enjoyed a period of independence, pioneering the angled deck, steam catapult and mirror landing aid. Yet economic decline and strategic shifts eroded progress. The cancellation of CVA-01 in the 1960s and the 1966 decision to end fixed-wing naval aviation led to the premature retirement of key carriers.
Fixed-wing capability returned in the late 1970s with the ski-jump-equipped Invincible-class ships and the Sea Harrier. The Falklands War in 1982 proved the value of embarked fixed-wing aviation: Sea Harriers accounted for 20 Argentine aircraft lost in air combat, a decisive contribution that would have been impossible without them.
The Sea Harrier FA2, equipped with the advanced Blue Vixen radar and AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles, represented a high point. Yet joint arrangements persisted. The Joint Force Harrier, established in 2000, shared Harrier GR and Sea Harrier assets between the RAF and FAA. RAF priorities frequently prevailed, sidelining naval requirements.
The Sea Harrier was retired prematurely in 2006 because funds could not be found to upgrade engines for both variants. When the RAF’s Harrier GR9s were themselves withdrawn in 2011, the FAA was left without fixed-wing aircraft until the F-35B arrived.
The two Queen Elizabeth-class carriers were designed explicitly around the F-35B and ski-jump operations. Yet procurement has been painfully slow. Only 48 of the promised 138 aircraft had been delivered by the end of 2025, with one lost in the Mediterranean in 2021.
Each carrier can embark up to 36 F-35Bs, though 24 is now the norm. The recent Strategic Defence Review decision to include 12 F-35A aircraft in the next batch of 27 purchases (15 F-35Bs and 12 F-35As, to be delivered by 2033) marks a troubling shift.
The F-35A offers advantages: it is roughly 15 per cent cheaper to buy and 8 per cent cheaper to operate than the F-35B, with greater range and payload.
These savings could support other programmes such as the Global Combat Air Programme. Strategically, the F-35A would allow the UK to rejoin NATO’s nuclear-sharing mission by carrying the B61-12 bomb, a capability absent since 1998.
Yet the costs are substantial. The F-35A cannot operate from the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers, undermining the entire Carrier Enabled Power Projection strategy. With only 62 F-35Bs now planned by 2033, carrier air wings face reduced capacity and inadequate attrition reserves.
This echoes the Joint Harrier Force experience, where divided priorities starved naval aviation of resources. The Ministry of Defence has suggested compensating by fitting UAVs or deck-launched missiles to the carriers - an admission that the core fixed-wing capability is being diluted.
Logistical complications compound the problem. The F-35A uses boom refuelling, incompatible with the RAF’s probe-and-drogue Voyager tankers. Dependence on American support or costly retrofits would be required. Introducing two variants also fragments training, maintenance and supply chains.
History is clear: when naval aviation is subordinated to RAF priorities, maritime needs suffer. The pre-Second World War neglect, the Joint Harrier Force tensions and now the reduced F-35B fleet all point to the same conclusion.
The FAA’s unique role in projecting power at sea demands full independence in training, procurement and doctrine. Only then can Britain ensure its carriers are equipped with the right aircraft in the right numbers to meet the challenges of an increasingly contested maritime environment.
The Government must act to safeguard this vital capability before further lessons are learned the hard way.
Mark Allatt is chairman of UK Defence First, a former parliamentary candidate, and a commentator on defence, security, and foreign policy matters.
