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The real test of space resilience is on the ground

Lee Willcox-Jones
November 20, 2026

When people picture a threat to Britain’s space infrastructure, they may imagine a missile, or a hostile state knocking a satellite out of orbit. It makes a dramatic headline. It is not where the main risk lies.

The disruption is already happening, through jamming and spoofing of satellite signals and cyber attacks on the ground systems and terminals that use them. And it is happening near the UK. On 9 November, interference disrupted aircraft approaching Schiphol airport, from a possible source at sea north of the Netherlands. In January, 13 European coastal states warned of sustained interference across the Baltic and North Sea. On 1 October, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency told ship owners and ports to plan for operating without GPS.

None of this requires anyone to touch a satellite. That is what I would most like MPs to take from our evidence to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy: Britain’s weak point is not in orbit. It is on the ground and in the services that rely on satellites without knowing it.

Some examples. In 2016, a GPS timing error of thirteen millionths of a second disrupted BBC national digital radio, because the transmitters take their timing from satellites. Many trains use satellite positioning to decide which doors to open at a short platform. When you call 999 from a mobile, your location usually comes from satellite positioning in your phone. On ships, GPS is built into radar, radios and clocks, so crews cannot simply go back to paper charts. None of these operators would call themselves space users, which is why the risk goes unseen.

Dependence that nobody sees is dependence that nobody plans for. Operators often hold a satellite service as a backup and rarely test it. In an emergency, it suddenly becomes the service they depend on most. And the comforting idea that we could go “back to paper” works for one service at a time, not for many at once.

The UK Government recognises this. The Space Strategy, the Resilience Action Plan and new work to map dependencies across critical infrastructure all aim at the right problem. On positioning and timing, government set up a National PNT Office to coordinate a risk that cuts across every department, and is building a ground-based eLoran backup, with timing services due from 2028.

Britain’s weak point is not in orbit. It is on the ground and in the services that rely on satellites without knowing it. Quote

But recognising a risk is not the same as being able to show we would cope. Two changes would help.

The first is clear ownership. Responsibility for space-enabled services is necessarily spread across departments and sectors, and vulnerabilities that cross all of them can end up belonging to none. That is a challenge for every government, not a failing of any one department. The House of Lords National Resilience Committee reached a similar conclusion this week, finding that fragmented leadership stops plans becoming action. The PNT Office shows what works: one place to coordinate a shared risk. The same approach should be taken to cover other critical space-enabled services, from satellite communications to Earth observation.

The second is proof. Government and operators should show that services are resilient, not assume it: an agreed minimum service, a known recovery time, and exercises that test the loss of the service, not just the loss of the satellite. The Coastguard’s new guidance is advice, not a requirement. Has anyone rehearsed a week without GPS at a major port? Digital twins, working software models of real systems, let us test that safely, without taking a live service offline. And a service shown to recover quickly gives a would-be attacker less reason to try.

Resilience also depends on having companies here that can supply a second route, fix what breaks and adapt quickly when a supplier or an ally says no. This month’s restrictions on a US-run satellite service in Ukraine show why. Contracts must guarantee access, and there must always be a second route.

Britain has businesses that can provide it, from terminals that switch between networks and orbits to secure connectivity from UK constellations. The most useful thing government can do for them is to buy from them.

None of this needs a new organisation or a new satellite. It needs someone to own the problem, a habit of testing and exercising, and a home market for the companies that can help. We must rise to the challenge. Our resilience as a society depends on our ability to keep our space-enabled services working.

Lee Willcox-Jones, Comment Central contributor

Lee Willcox-Jones is a defence and national security specialist. He has held roles at the tactical, operational and strategic level, across military domains, including as an MOD Strategic Adviser. He is currently a Senior Business Development Manager at the Satellite Applications Catapult.

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