Reformpolitik - Can centrist Conservatism regain its rudder in troubled waters?
In 2026, hope might seem a very foreign feeling to the Liberal Conservative.
With some exceptions, you are quite likely to develop sore eyes in the search for a coherent centre-right government that enjoys a viable mandate in Europe. Although the British electoral system creates a disproportionate impression of its popularity, Labour’s crushing defeat of the Conservative Party in July 2024 clearly rests as the statistical, and symbolic, zenith of our apparently continent-wide migration away from the centre-right.
This aspect of the political spectrum is one with a strong tradition which has conceivably widely appealing policies to people today: belief in the power of the market economy without capitulation to the worst excesses of capitalism, for example. Or a reverence for the importance of national and institutional traditions, without restricting social liberalism on an individual level. So where are the biggest threats to this Liberal Conservatism, and what is preventing its electoral success?
It is not the left-wing, nor even centrist parties, which represent the most ghoulish spectre threatening to haunt such centre-right conservatism. Rather, it is from the support for those parties that, to avoid internalising rather slanderous terms which presuppose political extremism, I will label as ‘the Further Right’.
In Britain, Reform UK is this very threat, currently enjoying a seven-point lead over the former governing party as of the 5th of January 2025, according to YouGov. Following the general election, having licked their wounds clean, the question for the Conservatives became one of regrouping, rethinking and - crucially - reenergising themselves and younger voters. In order to tackle their electoral problem head on, they require the formulation of an official - if clandestine - internal strategy of how to manage their relationship with Reform.
The first lesson in this new policy - a sort of Reformpolitik, if you will - is a simple one: you cannot out-Farage Farage. The man’s unquestionable charisma, public appeal and longstanding opposition to mass immigration is not a pedigree the Tories can develop overnight, and likewise throwing out statements, designed to sound as right-wing as possible, at random interjections (Robert Jenrick, I’m looking at you) will not fool the electorate.
Just as Priti Patel or Suella Braverman’s consistent rhetorical critiques of the current immigration system and headline-grabbing plans such as the Rwanda Scheme did not serve to convince people of Conservative sincerity when in office, nor does this approach. Shouting at the touchline, each competing to have the toughest stance on immigration, appears to younger voters as weak, defensive and inconsequential.
Parallel with this brief, however, is the thorny issue that just as the centre-right will make no ground by trying to replicate populist party leaders and their methods, nor will they make any political headway by throwing mud at them. Incessant and slanderous criticism of the Further Right, and certainly any suggestion that they are extremist or present a danger to democracy, simply plays into the hands of populist narratives of a vast centrist ‘deep state’ and the homogeneity of all mainstream political parties. Reformpolitik, therefore, is a delicate balancing act the Conservatives should be acutely aware of, whereby the two extremes of either imitation or defamation of their Further Right rivals are to be avoided.
So where can the Conservatives carve out their niche, their true electoral appeal which might distinguish themselves from Reform, and give them a mandate for centre-right conservatism? It is true, as James Carville so eloquently reminded us, that the economy will always be a silver bullet for any party during an election campaign. And it is likewise true that the Conservatives can indeed make political capital out of Reform’s perceived lack of credibility on economic policy. The problems with this are twofold.
Firstly, it is arguable that arguments of economic proficiency are actually more effective from the defensive position of a ruling party, than they are on an opposition campaign trail. See, for example, Theresa May’s campaign against Corbyn, albeit less successful than intended. It is far richer a political offer to warn of the chaos and uncertainty of a fringe opposition, than it is to convince the public they should return to the status quo for purposes of economic security, particularly when previous governments of the same colour provided little of it. But whilst Labour is in power, and as they continue to lay waste to components of our economy and wider culture that people on the right cherish, many feel we are already living in a post-apocalyptic world.
The worst possible scenario, electorally speaking, has already played out. And when things seem hopeless, and successive governments of different colours fail on key issues, voters are far more likely to migrate to populist alternatives out of a complete lack of faith in what they see as a multi-party coalition.
As Professor John Curtice recently noted, Reform voters are at present the great consummate sceptics of current polling trends. In fact, they exhibit less faith in the Conservative’s ability to govern than do Labour voters, and likewise the opposite is true: Reform voters have less belief in the Labour party’s ability to govern, than do even the Conservatives. Paradoxically, then, the more hopeless Britain's economic stability seems, and the worse the damage that Labour inflicts, the less potent the Conservative’s economic silver bullet becomes.
The second problem with the argument of centre-right economic credentialism is that, from a holistic strategic perspective, this, and any argument that sets forth the exceptionalism of the Conservatives over Reform (that, undeniably, they have greater experienced personnel, economic credibility, and simply the magnitude of their institutional set up) is equally an argument for - whisper it softly - amalgamation, and not competition.
If the Conservatives agree to agree with Reform on fundamental ideological issues, and indeed they do, Conservative arguments against ‘The Light Blues’ can only boil down to ones of experience, brand recognition and the accusations of unseriousness. All three of which, the Conservatives could readily provide if there were to be some form of collaborative effort towards the 2029 General Election.
I do not suggest that this should be engaged in at once, but it may provide Centrist and Liberal Conservatism’s best chance of true representation in the next parliament and, after all, key elements of a Centrist’s pride is the apparent belief in empirical and rational policy, and not ideological zealotry.
Ultimately, the relationship between the Conservatives and Reform is that which will be the most fascinating, and perhaps the most turbulent, of all during this parliament. Indeed the next election hangs in their power, and is within their gift, to deliver. What remains to be seen is how the two rivals negotiate their relationship over the next three years.
Stevan is a graduate of the LSE and the University of Cambridge, whose interests are in History and Politics
