Britain’s navy is woefully underprepared for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan
China may soon invade Taiwan, a conflict for which the Royal Navy needs to be ready. But as Benjamin Coates writes, our navy appears woefully unprepared for such an event.
China has been signalling its intentions regarding Taiwan very clearly. Extensive military drills in reaction to Pelosi's visit, suspension of military dialogue between America and China, Chinese military development, and the Party's August white paper's refusal to rule out 'reunification' by force. The Taiwanese defence ministry gives the year 2025 as the earliest possible date for an assault, while the Center for Strategic and International Studies used 2026 in recent war games.
There is good reason to believe that the Royal Navy could become involved, an event for which it is woefully ill-equipped. To prevent our navy from being unnecessarily vulnerable, certain purchases must be made now. Increasing the lethality of our navy could help to deter China from starting a universally tragic war.
Given the disparity in size between Britain and China, we would only ever intervene alongside the United States. But it seems ever more likely that the U.S. would engage in such a conflict. Although Biden's three statements proposing military intervention in the event of invasion were all 'walked back' by officials, many view them as a hardening of America's historic ambiguity – and the American military continues to prepare for such a war with China.
If this war breaks out, Britain may choose to support the United States. We have long seen American hegemony as in our interest. There are close ties between our armed forces – British and American forces are already training to fight together in the Pacific. Furthermore, our likely next Prime Minister – seen as something of a China hawk – has stated that 'Taiwan must be defended' and that 'we are working very closely with our allies.'
Our intervention would not be motivated by our allegiance to America alone. We have our own interest in preventing Taiwan's semiconductor industry from falling into the hands of an unfriendly power – and the Prime Minister of the time may also feel a moral duty to intervene. Emotion should not be disregarded; it has proven powerful in securing support for Ukraine.
Given the ever-increasing likelihood of intervention, we must quickly address our Navy's dangerous shortcomings.
The first problem our navy would face in a Pacific conflict is our insufficient number of carrier-borne fighters. The 48 F-35Bs we should have by 2025 are the end of our current order. There have been musings of an eventual total of between 60 and 80 – but musings cannot sink ships. The Ministry of Defence wishes to operate 24 F-35s on each carrier, but maintenance requires substantially more than 48 airframes to guarantee this. The American F-35B readiness rate of about 60 per cent shows that an order for a further 32 more must be placed now. F-35 acquisition must not be reduced or delayed in favour of the Tempest project, a landlocked fighter that's at least a dozen years away from entering service.
Equally troubling is the failure to properly arm those F-35s. For years to come, these aircraft will lack a long-range missile to attack surface targets, forcing our pilots to get within a few miles of the enemy and drop a bomb. This is dangerous to the aircraft and, worse, draws the carrier closer to Chinese anti-ship missiles.
Current plans are to address this by 2030 at the earliest, via an Anglo-French collaboration (FC/ASW) – but delays in defence projects are legion.
The result is an unacceptable capability gap. To address it, the risk-free purchase of proven Norwegian JSM missiles would allow our F-35s to strike targets up to 300 miles away. This would be a drastic increase in the lethality and survivability of our navy – all for a relatively modest cost.
Likewise, not one of our ships has attack missiles. The aged Harpoon was retired without an immediate replacement, with our ships also waiting for FC/ASW. This means that for the foreseeable future, only our six attack submarines pose any threat to the Chinese.
Thankfully, the Government seems more alive to this particular danger, with rumours of a purchase of the ship-borne version of the Norwegian missile. These improvements need to happen quickly – and for all of our warships. It should not be a 'fig leaf' acquisition that benefits only a handful of ships.
Similarly, five future frigates are intended to be built 'for but not with' such missiles, an unnecessary hobbling of their anti-surface capabilities. We won't spend enough money to obtain a lethal Navy, but will spend just enough to put thousands of sailors – and billions of pounds – in harm's way.
Cost is, of course, an issue. The public purse is besieged by all manner of worthy causes. However, the purchases detailed above should fit within Truss' proposed spending increase. If such expenditure saved our navy in the event of war – or helped deter the war altogether – the economic and humanitarian benefits would far outweigh the cost.
